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SAŽETAK 
 
Kroz većinu rada bavit ću se problemom mentalnog uzrokovanja, odnosno pitanjem 
mogu li mentalna svojstva imati kauzalne moći u fizičkom svijetu. Točnije, bavit ću se 
problemom kauzalne ekskluzije: budući da fizička svojstva isključuju mentalna svojstva u 
kauzalnim procesima, mentalna svojstva su kauzalno nepotrebna. Nakon analiziranja različitih 
mogućnosti rješavanja navedenog problema, cilj posljednjeg dijela rada jest ponuditi 
interpretaciju modela redukcije koju je iznio Jaegwon Kim. Prema tom modelu, mentalna 
svojstva mogu imati kauzalne moći ukoliko ih se identificira s njihovom funkcionalnim 
realizatorima. Ujedno smatram da je ovaj model trenutno najbolja opcija koju imamo u 
rješavanju problema mentalnog uzrokovanja.  
 U prvom poglavlju ovoga rada izložit ću motive za raspravu, odnosno pokazati zašto 
nam je mentalno uzrokovanje potrebno. Nakon toga slijedi kratki uvod u Descartesov dualizam 
supstancije i njegovim pokušajem rješavanja problema interakcije između uma i tijela. 
Dualizam supstancije ne uspijeva riješiti problem budući da krši princip fizičke zatvorenosti. 
Prikazat ću argument kauzalne ekskluzije i dilemu mentalnog uzrokovanja: ili mentalna 
svojstva imaju kauzalne moći, ili ih nemaju. Ukoliko ih nemaju, onda su epifenomenalna, 
odnosno kauzalno impotentna. Ukoliko ih imaju, onda postoji mogućnost da krše princip 
fizičke zatvorenosti. Prvo ćemo vidjeti zašto epifenomenalizam nije održiva opcija. Nakon toga 
analizirat ću opcije prema kojima možemo očuvati mentalno uzrokovanje. Prva grupa opcija 
će biti redukcionističke, točnije teorija identiteta i materijalni eliminativizam. Obje će te opcije 
biti odbačene. To nas dovodi do druge opcije: ne-reduktivni fizikalizam, a posebno Davidsonov 
anomalni monizam. Međutim, pokazat će se kako obje mogućnosti u konačnici dovode do 
problema kauzalne ekskluzije. Treća će opcija također biti ne-reduktivna te pokazuje na koji 
način kontrafaktička analiza kauzalnosti može očuvati mentalnom uzrokovanju. No, ispostavit 
će se da ni ta opcija neće biti u potpunosti uspješna. U posljednjem poglavlju prikazat ću Kimov 
model funkcionalne redukcije i nastojat ću pokazati kako nam taj model može pomoći u 
očuvanju mentalnog uzrokovanja.  
 
 
Ključne riječi: mentalno uzrokovanje, kauzalna ekskluzija, epifenomenalizam, redukcionizam, 
anti-redukcionizam, funkcionalna redukcija, Jaegwon Kim 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this thesis is twofold. For the main part, the aim is to deal with the problem 
of mental causation, answering the question of whether mental properties can have causal 
powers in a physical world. More precisely, it will deal with the problem of causal exclusion, 
according to which physical properties exclude mental properties in causal processes, making 
them causally inefficacious and inert. For the final part, after analysing different options that 
could resolve this issue, my aim is to provide an interpretation of Jaegwon Kim’s model of 
reductionism. According to this model mental properties do have causal powers because they 
are identified with their functional realizers. I will argue that this might be the best option we 
currently have in saving mental causation.  
In the first chapter I will explain motivation for mental causation, answering the 
question of why do we need mental causation at all? This will be followed by a rather brief 
preliminary introduction to Descartes’ substance dualism and his struggle to resolve the 
problem of mind-body interaction. Having seen how dualism fails to resolve the problem due 
to the principle of physical closure, I will present the argument of causal exclusion and the 
dilemma of mental causation: either mental properties have causal powers, or they do not. If 
they do not, they are epiphenomenal, i.e. causally impotent. If they do, they might be in danger 
of breaking the principle of physical closure. First, we will see why epiphenomenalism is not 
a tenable option. Then we turn to options that save mental causation. The first group of options 
will be reductionist in nature, namely identity theory and eliminative materialism, both of 
which will be rejected. This leads us to the second option: non-reductive physicalism, 
Davidson’s anomalous monism in particular. However, we will see that these two options in 
fact generate the problem of causal exclusion. The third option is also non-reductive, and it 
shows how counterfactual analysis of causation might save mental causation, but such an 
undertaking falls short from being successful. For the final chapter, Kim’s model of functional 
reductionism will be presented and analysed. I will try to show that this model saves mental 
causation.  
 
 
Keywords: mental causation, causal exclusion, epiphenomenalism, reduction, non-reduction, 
functional reductionism, Jaegwon Kim  
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Volitions do not enter into the chain of causation… The feeling that we call volition is not the 
cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause. 
– T. H. Huxley, 1874 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
  
1.1. Explaining behaviour 
 
What does it mean to say that my thoughts and my intentions caused me to behave in a 
specific manner? For example, what caused me to type down the previous sentence? Well, 
someone could easily argue that linguistic knowledge that I possess together with my wanting 
to express a thought that’s been boggling me caused me to type it down. A simpler example 
would be the following: I want to raise my hand and I do so. It seems rather hard to doubt these 
processes, as we use similar examples in our everyday life. Almost everything that we do, we 
attribute it to our thoughts, wishes, even qualitative mental states; when we go to see a doctor, 
we usually explain it by saying that something is hurting us, or that we are in pain. Moreover, 
psychology in its core rests on explanations in terms of our mental states. This is the key 
component of mental causation, the idea that our mental states have causal powers.  
However, the philosophical issue central to this thesis occurs when we start to interpret 
our behaviour and aforementioned causal processes using knowledge of neurosciences, 
medicine, physiology, physics, and other similar branches of science. Now, more than ever 
before, we have mapped out our brain processes to such detail that, at least in principle, every 
causal process can be explained in terms of the physical properties. We can explain our 
behaviour using neurosynaptic relations, prefrontal cortex, C-fibres, etc. What does this mean 
exactly? Let us take an example from Norman Malcolm (1968), whose work served as an 
inspiration to much of contemporary literature that I shall analyse in this thesis. Imagine a man 
climbing a ladder leading to the roof of his house. We also know that a wind blew off his hat 
which landed onto the same roof. What is the explanation for his behaviour, i.e. climbing the 
ladder to the roof? One explanation is rather simple, provided in terms of mental states as seen 
in the first paragraph. Malcolm spells it out in the following form:  
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If a man wants to retrieve his hat and believes this requires him to climb a ladder, 
he will do so provided there are no countervailing factors. 
This man wanted to retrieve his hat and believed that this required him to climb 
a ladder, and there were no countervailing factors. 
Therefore, he climbed a ladder. (Malcolm 1968: 48; emphasis added)  
The emphasis in this explanation is put on his beliefs and wanting to do something. Yet, we 
can also explain his behaviour by appealing to his neurophysiology, firing of neurons, chemical 
changes in body tissue, etc.1 (p. 52)  
 According to Malcolm (p. 52-3), the exact problem occurs when we have a collision of 
two explanations, or accounts: mental and physical, especially because the physical, i.e. 
neurophysiological theory is supposed to provide sufficient causal explanation. If his behaviour 
is completely accounted for physically, what is left for mental, or intentional? Malcolm argues 
that:   
given the antecedent neurological states of his bodily system together with 
general laws correlating those states with the contractions of muscles and 
movements of limbs, he would have moved as he did regardless of his desire or 
intention. If every movement of his was completely accounted for by his 
antecedent neurophysiological states (his "programming"), then it was not true 
that those movements occurred because he wanted or intended to get his hat. 
(Malcolm 1968, p. 53)  
Even more general upshot of the argument is that the physical excludes the mental when 
explaining certain behaviour. 
And thus, we reach the main question of this thesis: how is it possible for the mental to 
exert causal powers in the world that is fundamentally physical?2 If physical processes are 
causally sufficient for our behaviour, what purpose does the mental have? It is easy to realise 
why Malcolm’s work was so influential, as it would be hard to accept that our behaviour is 
nothing more but a consequence of a bunch of neurophysiological processes happening in our 
brain and our body. As Heil and Mele (1993) in their preface state, “we confront a dilemma. 
Either we concede that ‘purposive’, reason-giving explanations of behaviour have only a 
pragmatic standing, or we abandon our conception of the physical domain as causally 
autonomous.” (Heil and Mele 1993 p. v) 
 
                                                          
1 Clearly, such an explanation requires more finesse and detail than provided here, but the fundamental idea stands.  
2 Paraphrased from Kim (1998).  
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1.2. What do we need mental causation for? 
  
Before I continue with unravelling the issue of mental causation, one has to explain 
why many philosophers find this problem to be of utmost importance, as I share the same 
motivation with them. To get the full understanding, we need to answer the following question: 
what is it about mental causation that needs desperate saving? Why do we even need it? First 
and foremost, mental causation as such requires one thing: that mental properties causally make 
difference. If mental properties are causally superfluous, as Kim’s argument will show, then 
the consequences might be dire. One way to go about our need for mental causation lies in 
human agency and moral responsibility.3 The case is quite simple, as we have seen in the 
introduction. In order to explain our behaviour, we usually appeal to our mental states. Why 
am I writing this paper? Well, I want to graduate. In order to graduate, I know I need to write 
my thesis. These reasons are rather extrinsic, but I also have an intrinsic motivation; I am 
curious about the development of sciences, its implications to philosophy, and its future. My 
desires to know more, my intentions to graduate, my beliefs of what I need to do in order to 
achieve my goals – all of these elements seem crucial for my action, i.e. writing this thesis. Not 
only that, but if it weren’t for mental causation, I wouldn’t be able to write this thesis in a 
coherent and logically structured manner, since mental causation also has consequences on our 
memory and reasoning. As Kim argues: “if you take away perception, memory, and reasoning, 
you pretty much take away all of human knowledge.” (1998: p. 31)  
In other words, if it weren’t for mental causation, it would be hard to recognise 
ourselves as moral agents and it would be hard to attribute any moral values to our actions. 
This might seem like a far-fetched idea, but there are philosophers who infer even more radical 
consequences. Jerry Fodor (1989) believes that: 
If it isn't literally true that my wanting is causally responsible for my reaching, 
and my itching is causally responsible for my scratching, and my believing is 
causally responsible for my saying . . . , if none of that is literally true, then 
practically everything I believe about anything is false and it's the end of the 
world. (p. 156) 
Although I find this argument to be more of a hyperbole rather than a cataclysmic depiction of 
the end of the world, Fodor’s reasoning still shows this intuition that philosophers (and even 
philosophical laymen alike) almost unanimously share. In what follows, we will see in precise 
                                                          
3 I shall present similar arguments as Kim (1998), although further references can be found in Robb and Heil 
(2019).   
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detail what exactly threatens mental causation and how different philosophers have worked to 
resolve it. But first, let us briefly see how it all actually started.  
 
 
1.3. Descartes, substance dualism, and Princess Elisabeth  
 
There are two elementary things that need to be unpacked here. First, according to 
Descartes, what exists? To rephrase the question, what substances exist? Second, what is the 
relation between those elements? To simply answer the first one: there are two substances. As 
we know, Descartes famously starts his Meditations ([1641] 1993) with a “doubt”, calling into 
question everything he knows, presuming he might be tricked. The aim of this doubt is to see 
whether there is something that cannot be questioned, one thing that is certainly and necessarily 
true. For Descartes, that certainty lies in his cogito, ergo sum, “thought exists; it alone cannot 
be separated from me. I am; I exist – this is certain” (Second Meditation, p. 19/27). This leads 
him to the conclusion that there exists a thinking thing, a thinking substance, res cogitans. But 
there is also another substance, although one that can be brought into doubt. In the same chapter 
Descartes posits the existence of another substance, the material, corporeal and extended one, 
res extensa, out of which the physical world is constructed.4 
That answers the first question. Now, what about the relation between the mind and 
body, i.e. the material? The answer to this question might be unclear. First, in Sixth Meditation, 
he claims that the thinking thing and the physical, extended thing are radically different; “(…) 
it is certain that I [the thinking thing] am really distinct from my body, and can exist without 
it.” (p. 51/78). According to Descartes, the distinctness stems from the following properties: 
the thinking thing, i.e. the mind, is immaterial, lacking spatial dimensions, “utterly indivisible”, 
meaning it does not have parts, and it is indestructible by natural means – in other words, it is 
eternal. Body, on the other hand, is completely opposite – material, has spatial dimension, 
divisible and destructible. Yet, he claims that there is a “union”, the “commingling of the mind 
with the body” (p. 53/81), and even in the Sixth Meditation Descartes provides examples of 
causal interaction concerning sensation of pain (belonging to the mind) and its physical 
manifestation (p. 57/87).   
                                                          
4 To provide this brief and rather simplistic version of Descartes’ substance dualism, I have helped myself with 
Hatfield’s article on René Descartes from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  
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However, if that is the case, how exactly does the mental causally influence the 
physical? It seems rather unclear and even implausible that such a causal relation can even 
occur. Following the same intuitions, in 1643, Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia posed a problem 
to René Descartes’ substance dualism in a way that even Descartes himself struggled to find 
an adequate answer. In a letter to Descartes, Princess Elisabeth states the following:  
How the mind of a human being can determine the bodily spirits [i.e., the fluids 
in the nerves, muscles, etc.] in producing voluntary actions, being only a 
thinking substance. For it appears that all determination of movement is 
produced by the pushing of the thing being moved, by the manner in which it is 
pushed by that which moves it, or else by the qualification and figure of the 
surface of the latter. Contact is required for the first two conditions, and 
extension for the third. [But] you entirely exclude the latter from the notion you 
have of the body, and the former seems incompatible with an immaterial thing.5  
If these two substances are so radically different and opposite, with no contact whatsoever, it 
seems rather unclear how one could causally influence the other. To sum it up more formally: 
 P1: The mind and the body are two entirely different substances.  
P2: Entirely different substances cannot interact with one another6.  
C: Mind and body could not interact.7  
 
 
1.4. Completeness of the Physical or Physical closure 
 
 What does this tell us? Is there anything to be learned from Descartes? One might argue 
that Cartesian dualism is a thing of the past, something that not many philosophers believe to 
be a matter of fact, thus rendering this discussion irrelevant.  I believe there is something to be 
learned from Descartes. It seems to me that one valuable lesson, or principle that we can 
extrapolate is Physical Closure, a principle that Cartesian dualism tends to break. Philosophers 
                                                          
5 Elisabeth to Descartes, May 1643. This quotation is taken from Garber (2001: p. 172).   
6 This premise seems to be of utmost interest; Descartes thought this was not the case, but it is questionable 
whether he could argue otherwise successfully. One of the options he opted for later on in his work was 
introduction of the pineal gland, stating: “when the mind wants to remember something, this volition makes the 
gland incline successively in different directions” (cf. Garber 2001: p. 145-6). But even this interpretation seems 
to be unable to resolve the exact nature of the causal mechanisms, and as I am going to argue later in this paper, 
similar objections can be raised to non-reductive physicalism. 
7 This argument is also endorsed by Sarah Patterson (2005), who provides a more historical overview of the 
discussion.  
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almost unanimously agree that Descartes is in fact breaking a principle of  Energy Conservation 
(e.g. Dennett 1991; Fodor 1981). For example, Heil (2013) states that:  
Mass and energy are convertible, but the total amount of mass–energy is 
constant. Mind–body interaction threatens to violate conservation. Intervention 
from the ‘outside’ by a mind would increase total energy without a 
compensating loss of mass, and mass–energy would be lost were material 
bodies to affect minds. (p: 26)  
Later in this paper we will see that the principle of physical closure still plays a very important 
role in contemporary philosophy. The consequence of the principle is the following, as states 
by Kim:  
If you pick any physical event and trace out its causal ancestry or posterity, that 
will never take you outside the physical domain. That is, no causal chain will 
ever cross the boundary between the physical and the nonphysical. (Kim 1998: 
p. 40)  
If this principle is something that we could all agree on, and Kim together with many other 
philosophers (e.g. Robb and Heil 2019; Heil 2013) seem to argue that we really should accept 
it, then we face a dilemma that might not be so easy to solve.8   
 
1.5. Causal Exclusion  
 
Within Cartesian picture, the problem of mental causation occurs when substance 
dualism meets the scientific criteria of energy conservation, or physical closure. But the 
problem does not end there. We have already seen how Malcolm stresses out the problem of 
having two explanations and how one (physical) excludes the other (mental). Since 
explanations typically trace causation, the problem holds for causal powers as well. For that 
reason, what I am going to present now is the (in)famous causal exclusion argument, most 
famously developed by Jaegwon Kim (1998; 2005). The details of the argument, together with 
its motivation and Kim’s solutions are going to be presented later. For the purposes of this 
chapter, I will just provide a definition accompanied with an example. Kim defines the 
principle of causal exclusion in the following fashion:  
                                                          
8 It needs to be noted that there were interpretations of Descartes that explained the relation of mind and body in 
a dualist sense. His contemporary, Malebranche, believed in occasionalism. Just briefly, occasionalism 
posited that the interaction occurred by appealing to the action of God (Patterson 2005: p. 248). However, even 
these interpretations seemingly render mental causation to be irrelevant, i.e. not having any true causal powers.   
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Principle of causal exclusion. If an event e has a sufficient cause c at t, no event 
at t distinct from c can be a cause of e (unless this is a genuine case of causal 
overdetermination). (Kim 2005: 17) 
Before moving on, I need to briefly explain what overdetermination is. The concept of 
overdetermination implies cases where there are two sufficient causes. For example, two bullets 
hitting victim’s heart at the same time (Kim 2005: p. 48), or two kids throwing rocks at a 
window simultaneously. These cases rarely happen, but they are nonetheless possible. The idea 
is that both causes can bring about the effect, independent of each other.  
 What does this tell us about mental causation? For a start, let us imagine a situation 
from the beginning of the paper: me wanting to raise my hand and me doing so successfully. 
One interpretation of this case would be to say that my wanting to raise my hand caused me to 
do so. However, if we stick to Cartesian sense of “my wanting” as something non-physical, we 
break the principle of physical closure. This principle also implies that my raising of the hand 
is caused by something physical and neurosciences can explain it in terms of some 
neurosynaptic processes from my prefrontal cortex, through my body, all the way to the 
muscles in my arm, etc. If this is the case, do my mental states play any role in this process? If 
neurons or some other neurophysiological processes and states do all the causal work, what is 
left for my mental states? They seem to be causally inefficacious and inert, and this is central 
claim of epiphenomenalism – a position according to which we have mental states that are 
caused by some physical states, but they in turn do not have any causal powers. As Stoljar 
defines it, it is “a version of dualism according to which mental events and properties have no 
causal role in the production of physical events.” (Stoljar 2010: p. 234) 
 This “conclusion” is something that we could hardly accept. So, what options do we 
have? This generates a dilemma (Bregant, 2003), horns or which shall be the basis for this 
work: 
Either mental properties have causal powers od they do not. If they have them, 
we risk a violation of the causal closure of the physical domain; if they do not 
have them, we embrace epiphenomenalism, which denies any sort of causal 
powers to the mental. So, either we violate the causal closure of physics, or we 
end up with epiphenomenalism. (Bregant 2003: 305)  
These two horns of the dilemma are going to be tackled in the following sense. First, I will 
reject epiphenomenalism as an option, leaving the first horn, which claims that mental 
properties do have causal powers. This horn will in fact have two more options; a reductive 
11 
 
and non-reductive physicalism; either we adopt a reductionist theory which saves mental 
causation, but at a cost of reducing mental properties to physical or we can opt for non-
reductive physicalism and provide a theory that could save mental causation without having to 
reduce mental properties to physical. But first, as I said, I will try to avoid the threat of 
epiphenomenalism that the causal exclusion argument seems to posit.  
 
1.6. The Threat of Epiphenomenalism 
 
 First and foremost, what needs to be pointed out is that although this argument 
seemingly leads to epiphenomenalism, most of the authors (namely Kim 1998, or Yablo 1992) 
consider this argument to be reductio ad absurdum. Epiphenomenalism is option that we tend 
to reject, leaving us with the second horn of the dilemma, aiming to find an appropriate theory 
that could possibly save mental causation. The questions that I would like address in this 
chapter is the following: what is it about epiphenomenalism that is so “repulsive”? Can we just 
accept the conclusion that our mental properties do not have causal powers? They exist, sure, 
but they are causally inefficacious.  
 The problem with epiphenomenalism is that such a view is highly implausible. Kim 
states immediately that epiphenomenalism is “obviously wrong, if not incoherent.” (2005: p. 
70) Interestingly enough, out of the vast literature on mental causation, there is no serious 
debate on validity of epiphenomenalism9. It is considered an eccentric position, usually outright 
rejected as an option, with authors directly trying to find a solution to the causal exclusion 
problem (or some other problem of mental causation). There are some (e.g. Heil 2013) who 
mention the unavoidable battery of experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet (especially his 
1985 paper), trying to hint at a possibility of epiphenomenalism of being a real option. 
Nonetheless, it would still be philosophically questionable to claim that such experiments 
consequently corroborate epiphenomenalism.10 As instead, epiphenomenalism tends to be 
viewed in the similar light as radical scepticism. On such a view, the purpose of 
epiphenomenalism would be to question common sense, a version of a quite intriguing “what-
if…” I concur with Kim when he claims that:  
                                                          
9 One of rare exceptions would be Frank Jackson.  
10 Libet’s experiment shows that 550 ms before a voluntary act, a cerebral activity occurs, implying that “voluntary 
acts can be initiated by unconscious cerebral processes before conscious intention appears”. However, Libet also 
resists absolute impossibility for volition to have no effect whatsoever, claiming that “conscious control over the 
actual motor performance of the acts remains possible”, e.g. vetoing the actual motor activation. (1985: p. 529). 
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Just as reflections on sceptical arguments have deepened our understanding of 
the nature and limits of human knowledge, "worries" about epiphenomenalism 
may well lead to a deeper understanding of just what our mentality consists in 
and how it is related to our physical nature. (1998: p. 62)  
This seems to be true, as the epiphenomenal consequence of the causal exclusion argument has 
created a plethora of papers and books trying to unveil this mystery that is mind-body 
interaction; this one included.  
 One final remark before venturing onto different resolutions to Kim’s exclusion 
problem: epiphenomenalism claims that the mental is causally inert, but this is very 
implausible. Kim says, “it is the problem of showing how mental causation is possible, not 
whether it is possible.” (1998: p. 61) Bearing that in mind, let us see how reductive physicalists 
try to resolve the issue of causal exclusion. I will briefly analyse two options: identity theory 
(or type physicalism) and eliminative materialism.  
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2. REDUCTIVE PHYSICALISM 
 
There are two radically opposing options that this chapter will show, and their common 
denominator will be reductionism, the idea that mental states can be reduced to physical states. 
One option is that we might be able to save mental causation and claim that mental properties 
can have causal powers, but only if they are identified with physical states. The other option is 
slightly more radical, as it implies that not only are mental states reducible, they can also be 
eliminated.  
 
2.1. Type Identity Physicalism 
 
During the 1950s, a series of papers had been published which would radically change 
the direction of philosophy. Namely, papers published by Herbert Feigl, U. T. Place, and J. J. 
C. Smart all shared one common thread: the idea that “minds are material entities – brains – 
and mental properties are, as a matter of discoverable empirical fact, material properties of 
brains and nervous systems.” (Heil 2013: p. 74; also Berčić 2012: p. 163). In the first part of 
this paragraph I would try to unbox this idea and see what it really implies.  
First and foremost, the motivation for such an undertaking comes from scientific 
development of that time. It was first believed that correlations had been located between 
certain mental and physical states. The most famous of such correlations that inspired this entire 
debate has been pairing up “pain” with the “activation of C-fibres”. Now, let us suppose that 
for each occurrence of a certain mental property we have successfully paired it up with its 
physical correlate. The question is, what do we make of this correlation? Surely, it cannot be 
just an accidental co-occurrence. There must be something to it. What Smart and other 
mentioned philosophers argued was it is something more than correlation; the mental states are 
identified with the physical states. In the same way as we have identified lightning with 
electromagnetic discharge, or temperature with mean molecular kinetic energy, or water with 
molecular structure of H20, we have to identify pain with the activation of C-fibres.
11 Smart 
concludes that: 
should [visual, auditory, and tactual sensations, aches and pains] be correlated 
with brain processes does not help, for to say that they are correlated is to say 
                                                          
11 It does have to be noted that in the following years, the exact neurosynaptic basis for pain was shown to be a 
bit more complex than just the activation of C-fibres, but I do not think that this completely changes the discussion. 
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that they are something "over and above”. You cannot correlate something with 
itself." (1959; p. 142 emphasis unchanged)12 
A more general principle of the identity theory is provided by Heil:  
(I) a state, event, or process, α, is identical with state, event, or process β, only if the properties 
involved in α and β are identical. (2013: p. 75) 
To gain a better understanding of this principles, let us use these two propositions:  
a) Superman is a superhero. 
b) Superman is Clark Kent. 
It seems that in both these cases we have used some kind of identification. In the first case, we 
have identified Superman as a superhero, and in the other we have identified Superman as 
Clark Kent (and both these propositions are true). However, only the second proposition really 
makes a statement of α is β. The first proposition is one of predication; we have provided an 
attribute to Superman, it says something about him, but it is not the statement of identification 
(as there are countless superheroes nowadays)13. So, analogous to identifying pain with C-
fibres; we haven’t simply provided an attribute, or a characteristic of pain. No, we have 
identified it with some brain process, we have shown what it actually is, same as we have shown 
what lightning or temperature actually is.  
  The question that we pose ourselves now is: how does this help us with the problem of 
mental causation? The solution is simple. Mental properties indeed do have causal powers and 
they enter causal relations without breaking the principle of physical closure because mental 
properties just are physical properties (they are nothing over-and-above physical properties). 
For example, if we claimed that pain caused us to wince and groan, and pain is nothing more 
than the activation of C-fibres, then we (i) don’t encounter the problem of overdetermination 
since there are not two competing causes and (ii) since C-fibres caused us groan and wince, we 
thus also avoiding the problem of physical closure. Clearly, this isn’t something that many 
philosophers would like to have, as it immediately implies at least some sort of 
epiphenomenalism; it is not pain in and of itself that caused me to groan and wince, and I 
believe that it really was the pain, not some C-fibres. Pain once again seems to be irrelevant. 
                                                          
12 This is also why this version of identity theory is also called type identity, as one type of thing is reduced to 
another; pain as a type is reduced to and identified with C-fibres, a physical type. 
13This distinction is important when it comes to notions of numerical and qualitative identity. “It’s the same hat” 
can mean that it is numerically one and the same hat, or it can mean that it completely resembles another hat.  
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However, I do believe that such a view simply does not fully grasp the idea behind the identity 
theory. The identity theory does not claim that pain has no causal powers, quite contrary, it 
does. Pain causes us to groan and wince insofar as it just is the activation of C-fibres.  
 Such a view certainly has a lot of merits. First, scientific advancements go hand in hand 
with philosophical theory. Naturally, the sciences and especially neurosciences, still have a lot 
of unpacking and understanding to do. Although we are now closer than ever to understanding, 
deciphering, or mapping out our brain, there are still countless phenomena that we have yet to 
explain. It is just a matter of time when we succeed in doing that. One can often encounter 
arguments (albeit amongst scientific and philosophical laymen) that medicine or sciences in 
general have still not found answers to some questions. Therefore, we will never be able to 
completely reduce all of our mental states to corresponding physical ones. I believe such an 
inference is not valid. Nevertheless, it gives motivation to scientists to persevere in finding 
answers. Second merit that I would like to point out is that philosophically, and 
argumentatively, identity theory makes a strong case when it comes to saving mental causation 
without breaking principles of overdetermination and physical closure. However, as I am going 
to show now, physicalism may have a downside, which would lead us into rejecting it, at least 
in the form of identity theory, and pursue us into finding another option. 
 
2.2. Functionalism and Multiple Realizability 
   
Despite gaining momentum in the 1950s, identity theory in this form soon came to its 
downfall. The counterargument directed towards the physicalism was rather simple, but to a 
large extent put an end to identity theory, at least in this form. The argument is the so-called 
argument of multiple realizability, as famously suggested by Hilary Putnam. What Smart and 
other physicalists wanted was one-to-one identification of mental states with physical states. 
However, according to Putnam we can easily imagine some non-human beings that would 
arguably share the same mental states, but instead have something else activated. For example, 
we can imagine a Martian who is feeling pain and instead of C-fibres, in his case M-fibres are 
activated. The question is, how is it possible that they share completely same mental state, but 
they have different physical ones? According to Putnam, the main problem is that we are going 
about mental states in a completely wrong manner. This serves as the basis for functionalism.14 
                                                          
14 The most notable figures when it comes to functionalism are Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor. 
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Although it is difficult to find a unitary definition of functionalism, the key notion essential to 
functionalism are functional roles that our mental states have, as opposed to trying to reduce 
them to their neurophysiological basis.15 So, according to this definition, we should observe 
pain, for example, as a mental state with specific functional roles (usually its role is to make us 
groan, wince, or something else). (Heil 2013) The problem is not that we cannot find the 
physical base, the problem is that different physical realizers can realize one mental state (best 
depicted in Figure 1), consequently disabling us from positing type identity.   
 
                 M1   (the mental state, e.g. pain) 
 
 
P1 P2 P3 P4 (physical realizers, e.g. C-fibres, M-fibres, etc.)       (Figure 1)16 
 
Furthermore, it is useful to think of these relations in terms of levels; pain being a higher-level 
property, and C-fibres, M-fibres, or all other possible pain’s realizers, being lower-level 
properties.  
Based on these arguments, there are two conclusions that can be inferred from Putnam’s 
argument: (i) type identity as required by identity theorists is not sustainable and (ii) mental 
states might not even be reducible to physical states. Whether (ii) is true or not still remains to 
be seen, but according to the functionalism that Putnam suggest, this seems to be the case. 
Putnam’s legacy is still present in some non-reductive approaches to mental causation, as we 
will see in the chapter 3. We have seen how one reductive option fails to save mental causation. 
Can the second option, one of eliminative materialism save it? 
 
2.3. Eliminative Materialism 
 
 If identity theory, or type physicalism, was at the one end of the reductive spectrum, 
this theory is on the other; and that is eliminative materialism. One of the most famous 
                                                          
15 For these arguments I have used two sources; Berčić (2012) and Heil (2013). Putnam’s paper that I have used 
was The Nature of Mental States from his Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (1975). That 
paper is a reprint of his 1967 paper titled Psychological Predicates. 
16 This figure also shows the relation of levels from the chapter 3.1., with the mental states being higher-level 
properties, and their realizers lower-level properties. 
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proponents of this position, Paul Churchland17, opens his 1981 paper on eliminative 
materialism with the following strong claim: 
Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our commonsense conception of 
psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so 
fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory 
will eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed 
neuroscience. (1981: p. 67)  
The idea is quite radical, and it requires of us to completely abandon any ontology that contains 
our mental states. The theory is originally a critique of the folk psychology, considering it to be 
completely false and wrong.18 This critique consequently shows that we should reduce any talk 
of mental states to talk of neurophysiological processes. This reduction, in opposition to 
physicalism presented in the last chapter, eliminates any and all mental states. To get a clearer 
picture of how eliminativism of this kind should work, we just need to observe the history of 
science; before we believed in phlogiston, but then it was replaced by a better theory of 
oxidation, and thus phlogiston was eliminated. Similarly, before scientists believed in vital 
spirit, but then it was proved to be incorrect and false, and thus completely eliminated. Now, 
argues Churchland, folk-psychology is incorrect and false, and thus we should completely 
reject the ontology of mental states, and replace it with neurosciences.  
 What makes this position interesting in the context of this paper is how it actually deals 
with the problem of mental causation. Because once you eliminate mental states, you 
consequently eliminate all issues relating to mind-body interaction. For that reason, there is no 
problem of mental causation anymore, because there are no mental states. When we say that I 
ordered a salad instead of a chocolate cake because I thought it would be the best option for 
me and my health, such an interpretation is utterly wrong because there are no such things as 
my intentional mental states. Instead, such talk of what caused me to choose a salad over a 
chocolate cake should be reduced to neurosynaptic explanations; probably somewhere in my 
prefrontal cortex a network of neurological pathways activated which led me to taking a salad.  
 This is certainly something appealing in this theory. However, it is far from tenable. 
There are different ways to refute eliminative materialism (Lycan 2005), from it being self-
refuting, i.e. an eliminative materialist has to claim that they believe that there are no beliefs, 
                                                          
17  Together with his wife Patricia Churchland, they have written numerous papers and books on this topic. Another 
proponent of this theory is Stephen Stitch, but in this work, I will only use the paper by Paul Churchland. 
18 A great outline of the arguments proposed by eliminative mater is set by Lycan (2005).  
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to simply rejecting it on the common-sense basis. In my opinion, a much stronger argument 
against eliminativism is that although folk psychology may be imprecise, it is far from being 
completely wrong, as we tend to have successful inferences about our behaviour based on our 
mental states. Not only that, but if there are no mental states whatsoever, how is it possible that 
we were at least somewhat successful in predicting and explaining certain behaviours?19 I 
would not like to get far into details here. As instead, I would like to draw the same conclusion 
as I did with epiphenomenalism. I believe that eliminativism has interesting and thought-
provoking upshots that motivate further inquiry in philosophy of mind. When it comes to any 
discussion on mental causation and its relation to folk-psychology or neurosciences, there are 
still a lot of unclarities that are left to uncover. But if we simply eliminate such possibility to 
move forward, we will never make any progress. As instead, eliminativism should serve more 
as a motivation, rather than a solution to our problems.  
 In the next chapter I turn to non-reductive approach to saving mental causation. Though, 
I have to mention one thing: identity theory and eliminativism are not the only reductive models 
trying to save mental causation. In chapter 6, I will analyse Kim’s solution to the problem of 
causal exclusion, which is going to functional reductionism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 See Biondić (2017). 
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3. NON-REDUCTIVE PHYSICALISM 
 
Going to back to the horns of our initial dilemma, in this chapter I would like to answer the 
following question: how do we save causal powers of mental states in a physical world, without 
having to reduce them neurological ones? Surely, there must be something more to our mental 
states other than neurosynaptic and physiological processes? But how do we account for that 
distinctness? I will analyse two ways that account for this distinctness: non-reductive 
physicalism defined in more general terms and Davidson’s anomalous monism. Although there 
is no unified or a single theory of non-reductive physicalism, there are perhaps three doctrines 
that all variances of this theory share, at least according to Kim (2005), and they are: (i) mind-
body supervenience, (ii) the physical irreducibility of the mental, and (iii) the causal 
efficaciousness of the mental20. What these principles aim to show is that mental properties 
have causal powers by being supervenient on physical properties. According to this argument, 
any time a physical property upon which a mental property supervenes causes another property, 
that mental property also causes it. I believe that this approach to mental causation is false and 
in the next chapter I will argue that it is false on the basis of the causal exclusion argument.   
 
3.1. Three Principles of Non-reductive Physicalism 
The concept of supervenience implies a hierarchy of properties, where higher-level properties 
are determined by, or depend on lower-level properties. Kim defines it as:  
Supervenience. Mental properties strongly supervene on physical/ biological 
properties. That is, if any system s instantiates a mental property M at t, there 
necessarily exists a physical property P such that s instantiates P at t, and 
necessarily anything instantiating P at any time instantiates M at that time. (Kim 
2005: p. 33)  
Kim has probably been the most influential philosopher in developing the concept of 
supervenience (Kim 1993), which one might find ironic, as Kim is going to criticise the same 
concept that he refined. What does supervenience entail?21 Let us take the already used example 
of pain and C-fibres. Supervenience suggests that when a person feels pain (s instantiating a 
                                                          
20 The analysis that follows is based solely on Kim’s account of non-reductive physicalism (2005: p:33-5). 
Although it is possible to find nuances in definitions, I believe that every non-reductive physicalist would be able 
to accepts these doctrines.  
21 The concept of supervenience occurs in different contexts and its origin is still up for debate. It is used in 
different areas of philosophy, for example aesthetics, ethics, and other fields. For the current purposes, I am using 
supervenience to depict relation between mental and physical states.  
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mental property M), that person is also instantiating a physical property at the same time, which 
is in this case the activation of C-fibres. And, further on, every time a person’s C fibres are 
activated (instantiating P), that person also feels pain (instantiating M). The main question is: 
how might supervenience help non-reductive physicalists in saving mental causation? As Kim 
argued in 1993: “when a mental event M causes a physical event P, this is so because M is 
supervenient upon a physical event, P*, and P* causes P.” (Kim 1993: 106) In other words, 
when my pain is causing me to groan or wince, it is doing so by being supervenient upon C-
fibres, and C-fibres are causing me to behave in that manner.  
One thing is worth mentioning: supervenience does not entail mere correlation; that 
every time C-fibres activate, pain follows. It is a stronger, metaphysical claim of dependence, 
the instantiation of pain occurs because C-fibres get fired up; supervenience “includes a claim 
of existential dependence of the mental on the physical.” (Kim 2005: p. 34). Just to avoid any 
further confusion, one note before moving on to the next doctrine. Supervenience is an 
asymmetrical relation, meaning that if the mental supervenes on the physical, it cannot be the 
other way around. (Kim 1984: p. 67) Another useful interpretation of this relation would be to 
say that every change in the supervenient property (in this case that would be mental property, 
or pain), implies changes in the base property (physical property, or C-fibres).22 
 Crucial to the non-reductive physicalism is the second doctrine and it states the 
following: 
Irreducibility. Mental properties are not reducible to, and are not identical with, 
physical properties.  (Kim 2005: p. 34)  
This doctrine is first and foremost a reaction to Smart and other identity theorists that were 
analysed in the previous chapter, and a continuation on functionalism. What non-reductive 
physicalists claim is that there are certain properties outside the domain of physical. For 
example, pain may be supervenient on some physical properties (activation of C-fibres), but it 
is certainly not reduced, or identical to them. This move is motivated by the argument of 
multiple realizability, according to which mental properties (or types, to be more precise) are 
not reducible to physical, as there can be different physical properties that realize the same 
mental property. Another notion of irreducibility will be encountered soon in Davidson’s 
                                                          
22 For this interpretation of supervenience, I am using Kim’s Concepts of Supervenience (1984).  
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anomalous monism, which together with functionalism are “the best-known examples of non-
reductive physicalism.” (Kim 2005: 158) 
 Finally, such mental properties which are irreducible and supervenient on physical 
properties are, according to these theorists, causally efficacious.  
Causal efficacy. Mental properties have causal efficacy—that is, their 
instantiations can, and do, cause other properties, both mental and physical, to 
be instantiated. (Kim 2005: p. 35)  
I believe there is no need to once again elaborate on this doctrine, as it is the first premise from 
which our arguments begin. For example, pain that we experience causes us to groan and wince 
(physical effects), and it can also cause some emotional distress (mental effects).  
 
3.2. Anomalous Monism 
 
One of the pioneers in the non-reductive approach to physicalist interpretation of mind-
body relation was Donald Davidson, with his influential paper Mental Events (1970), where he 
proposed a new theory of the relation between the mental and the physical; anomalous monism. 
Now, although it is possible to write a whole dissertation on just one of the tenets and principles 
of his position, I will provide just a brief summary of his position. This elaboration on 
Davidson’s paper will show how his theory relates to a more general approach to non-reductive 
physicalism depicted above, and how both of these positions generate what Kim calls the causal 
exclusion problem.  
First, what is Davidson’s aim? Davidson starts off his essay with a quote on Kant who 
tries to reconcile “freedom and natural necessity in the same human action” (cf. Davidson 1970: 
207). Similar motivation strikes Davidson, as he is finding a way to reconcile causal role of 
mental events without having to completely reduce them to physical events, and he tries to do 
that by supposing anomalous monism. So, the best way to understand Davidson, in my opinion, 
would be to simply dissect what anomalism and monism stand for in his theory. When it comes 
to anomalism, Davidson starts off with three principles which seem to stand in an ‘apparent 
contradiction’ (1970: p. 208).23 They are the following24:  
                                                          
23 This ‘apparent contradiction’ is a reference to Immanuel Kant    
24 Together with Davidson’s paper (1970), two other sources will be used; Robb and Heil (2019) and Kim (1998). 
There are numerous other secondary sources that I have found useful in interpreting Davidson, for example Heil 
and Mele (1993), although here they refer mostly to his later work.  
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Principle of Causal Interaction: Some mental events interact causally with physical 
events. (Davidson 1970: 208) 
I have already put forward different examples and cases of this. Davidson uses an example of 
sinking the Bismarck and events that played a causal role in bringing about sinking the 
Bismarck, “such as perceivings, notings, calculations, judgements, decisions, intentional 
actions, and changes of belief” (p. 208) Such cases don’t seem problematic, at least not prima 
facie. The problem occurs when the next two principles are introduced.    
Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality: Events related as cause and effect 
fall under strict laws.25 (Davidson 1970: 208) 
Anomalism of the Mental: There are no strict laws on the basis of which mental events 
can be predicted and explained. (Davidson 1970: 208) 
Although Davidson initially doesn’t offer much of elaboration on what is meant by the last 
principle, the gist is that unlike laws of physics which are deterministic (or exceptionless, as 
Robb and Heil (2019) interpret it), laws of psychology are not! This constitutes anomalism, 
and this is also the non-reductive element of Davidson’s theory. According to Davidson, as 
there are no strict psychological laws like there are physical laws, mental events are not 
reduced to physical; pain is not reducible to some physical realizer (for example C-fibres) on 
the basis of absence of strict psychological laws. Davidson does claim that “mental 
characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics.” 
(1970: p. 214), something that we have seen with non-reductive physicalism in general, making 
it clearer in what sense Davidson is a non-reductive physicalist. However, if we accept this, we 
still need to find a way for mental events to enter causal relations. Since the principle of causal 
interaction requires strict laws, the nomological character of causality, and the mental lacks it. 
This is the apparent contradiction that Davidson anticipated. However, Davidson has a way 
out.  
 Davidson’s ingenious solution is simply to say that every mental event is in fact also a 
physical event – hence the monism! (1970: ch. 2) Kim perfectly emphasises this monism in the 
following paragraph:  
(…) mental events in causal relations must instantiate laws but since there aren't 
any psychological laws, that can only mean that they instantiate physical laws. 
This shows that mental events fall under physical kinds (or have true physical 
                                                          
25 In other words, where there is causality, there must be a law. (Davidson 1970: p. 208).  
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descriptions), from which it further follows, argues Davidson, that they are 
physical events. (1998: p. 33)  
Therefore, taking all Davidson’s principles into consideration, I believe that Davidson tries to 
save mental causation insofar as mental events indeed enter causal relations, but they instantiate 
physical laws since there are no psychological strict laws, thus claiming that those mental 
events are also physical events, although certainly not reducible to (but perhaps supervenient 
on) them.26 In Davidson’s own words: 
Anomalous monism resembles materialism in its claim that all events are 
physical, but rejects the thesis, usually considered essential to materialism, that 
mental phenomena can be given purely physical explanations. Anomalous 
monism shows an ontological bias only in that it allows the possibility that not 
all events are mental, while insisting that all events are physical. (Davidson 
1970: 214) 
Although Davidson differs from functionalists in some aspect, the key notions of non-reductive 
physicalism are still present, especially mental efficacy and irreducibility. Supervenience was 
developed later on, but Davidson’s argument saves this notion of having both mental and 
physical, without reducing one to another and saves the notion of mental causation.  
However, is this enough? I do not think that these conditions will suffice for preserving 
mental causation and in the following chapter I will show why. For now, let us see a parallel 
that Kim draws between Descartes and Davidson: 
there is an instructive parallel between Descartes's mind-body problem and the 
way the current debate on mind-body causation arose. For it was Davidson's 
anomalous monism that first touched off the current worries about mental 
causation. ... In a way that is reminiscent of Descartes's sharp separation of mind 
from matter, Davidson conceived of mental phenomena as constitutively 
distinct from physical phenomena… And yet, like Descartes, Davidson wanted 
causal interaction between mental and physical events… The only difference 
between Descartes and Davidson is that for the former it was the dualism of 
substances that caused the trouble, while for the latter it was his dualism of 
properties. (Kim 1998: p. 58)  
 
                                                          
26 A brief note; Davidson’s interpretation here is one of token identity (in contrast to type identity we have seen 
before). On the example of pain, this only means that individual cases of pain are also individual cases of some 
physical kind. 
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4. CAUSAL EXCLUSION AND NON-REDUCTIVISM 
 
Although non-reductive physicalism strived towards saving the intuition of both having 
mental and physical without reducing one to another and without breaking the principle of 
physical closure, there was still one major problem that followed – the problem of causal 
exclusion. The problem is a result of inconsistency between the principles of non-reductive 
physicalism and the principles of physical closure and overdetermination. I have already 
anticipated the argument in a simpler form and now I will present it step by step, as according 
to Kim (2005). To list them once more for clarity, these are the principles that will render 
inconsistency and show that non-reductive physicalism cannot defend mental causation: 
Mental Efficacy, Supervenience, Irreducibility – these three being principles of non-reductive 
physicalism, and Physical Closure and Overdetermination. 
First, I would like to present one of the simpler versions of the argument. For each line 
of the argument I have added which principle it stands for, although the exact and complete 
form of the argument is by Yablo (1992):   
If a property F is causally sufficient for a property G, then no property distinct 
from F is causally relevant to G, barring overdetermination.” (exclusion – 
overdetermination) 
For every physical property P*, there is a physical property P that is causally 
sufficient for P. (physical closure) 
For every mental property M, M is distinct from P. (irreducibility) 
_______________________________________________________________ 
For every physical property P*, there is no mental property M that is causally 
sufficient for P*. (exclusion, i.e. epiphenomenalism) (Yablo 1992, 247-248) 
What follows is the more detailed version of the argument, given by Kim. To 
completely understand the argument, I shall now provide a detailed step-by-step analysis. Each 
line of the argument is taken from Kim, accompanied by explanation of what they present and 
how one line follows from another. To say once more, in his argument Kim assumes 
aforementioned five principles and wants to show that they yield inconsistency!  
First, let us assume a case of mental-to-mental causation. The argument will work for 
both mental-to-mental and mental-to-physical. For example, imagine a case where pain causes 
us to groan and wince (mental-to-physical), but it also causes us some distress (mental-to-
mental). This is going to be the doctrine of Mental Efficacy:  
(1) M causes M*. (Kim 2005: 39) 
25 
 
From Supervenience it follows that:  
(2)  For some physical property P*; M* has P* as its supervenience base. (Kim 2005: 
39) 
Now, P* necessitates the occurrence of M*, which begs two options; one is that P* was already 
instantiated, without M, or M had something to do with the occurrence of P*. In other words, 
in order for M* to be instantiated, P* has to be instantiated. Therefore, M* first has to cause 
P* in order to bring about M*. Therefore:  
(3) M caused M* by causing its supervenience base P*. (Kim 2005: 40) 
These three steps so far show that if we want supervenience to work, in order to have mental-
to-mental causation, we first need to have mental-to-physical. Furthermore, from 
supervenience it also follows that:  
(4) M has a physical supervenience base, P. (Kim 2005: 41) 
Here’s where it gets tricky. From Closure and from (3) it follows:  
(5) M causes P*, and P causes P*.27 (Kim 2005: 41) 
Further on, from Irreducibility it follows:  
(6) M ≠ P (Kim 2005: 42) 
From (5) and (6) it follows that:  
(7) P* has two distinct causes, M and P, and this is not a case of causal 
overdetermination. (Kim 2005: 44) 
This step leads us to the causal exclusion principle, which states that: “No single event can 
have more than one sufficient cause occurring at any given time—unless it is a genuine case 
of causal overdetermination.” (Kim 2005: p. 42) This leaves us with two options, either we 
have to let go of M as a cause or P. For Kim, the solution is simple:  
(8) By Closure and Exclusion, M must go; P stays. The putative mental cause, M, is 
excluded by the physical cause, P. That is, P, not M, is a cause of P*. (Kim 2005: 
44) 
                                                          
27 Another version of this step would be “P* has a physical cause—call it P—occurring at the time M occurs.” 
(Kim 2005: p. 44)  
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Just to elaborate on this a bit further. Why not choose M as the cause of P* instead of P? Well, 
if we wanted that, we would break the principle of Closure, as there must be a physical cause 
of P*. Second, why can’t we say that both M and P caused P*? The problem lies in 
Overdetermination. Overdetermination works only if there are two separate, independent 
causal chains that lead to the same effect. However, this is not the case because of 
Supervenience. Overdetermination claims that we can imagine a possible world in which one 
causal chain hadn’t occurred, but the effect is still the same because of the other causal chain. 
With mental causation that is not the case, as we cannot imagine a possible world in which 
mental chain does not occur without its subvenient physical base. Thus, those two chains are 
not sufficient, as one depends on the other.28 As I final touch to this argument, I shall provide 
a figure (Figure 2) that perfectly encapsulates the argument.29  
Figure 2. 
 This brings us back to the same upshot from the beginning of the paper: 
epiphenomenalism.  Kim clearly finds this conclusion hard to accept, stating that “the idea that 
our thoughts, wants, and intentions might lack causal efficacy of any kind is deeply troubling, 
going as it does against everything we believe about ourselves as agents and cognizers.” (2005: 
p. 70) We can reject epiphenomenalism, but that still does not resolve the question of how 
exactly mental properties have causal powers.  
One of the ways in which non-reductive physicalists tried to battle off Kim’s argument of 
causal exclusion was by appealing to counterfactual analysis of causation, most famously 
developed by David Lewis. In the next chapter I will provide an analysis of that approach, as 
well as a brief introduction to Lewisian counterfactuals. Finally, I will show why such an 
approach is not sufficient for preservation of mental causation.   
 
                                                          
28 These arguments are presented in Kim’s chapter Is Overdetermination and option? (2005: p. 46-52)  
29 Barry Loewer calls this “Kim’s favorite diagram” (2007: p. 257). Similar diagram is also showcased by Sesardić 
(1984) 
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5. A COUNTERFACTUAL ACCOUNT 
 
The central idea of mental causation is that physical effects depend on mental states. This 
notion of dependency, argue some philosophers, is enough to claim that mental properties can 
indeed be difference makers. Some authors believe that this dependence is counterfactual 
dependence and that counterfactual conditionals are the best way to grasp it. Tyler Burge 
(1993), for example, argues:  
one can specify various ways in which mental causes 'make a difference' which 
do not conflict with physical explanations. The differences they make are 
specified by psychological causal explanations, and by counterfactuals 
associated with these explanations. (p. 115; emphasis added) 
The notion of counterfactuals is important to non-reductive physicalism and it aims to argue 
the following: had the mental property not occurred, the physical effect would not have 
occurred. The idea of counterfactuals is rather complex, but I will try to briefly explain it before 
getting to the core of counterfactual mental causation.   
 
5.1. Causation and Lewisian counterfactuals  
 
Lewis’ counterfactual analysis of causation is a multi-layered, complex theory that’s 
been in development for decades now and it would be ungrateful towards Lewis to sum it up 
in less than a page. However, we have to briefly analyse Lewisian idea of counterfactuals, since 
they play a huge role in contemporary philosophy, especially metaphysics. Despite its 
complexity, in the crux of this theory, there is a seemingly simple proposition. When we claim 
that an event c caused event e, by that we mean that if c had not occurred, e would not have 
occurred. (Lewis, 1973) Let us take an example, and see what this actually implies. Suppose 
that a striking of a match caused it to light. Counterfactual analysis of this claim would result 
in the following proposition:  
C – If the match had not been struck, it would not have lighted. (Kim 2007: 233) 
So far, this seems to be unproblematic. However, what is it that makes this proposition to be 
true? Here is where it gets slightly complicated. In order to see what makes this proposition 
true, we need what is called comparative over-all similarity among possible worlds. (Lewis 
1973: p. 8-13) The main line of argumentation is the following: out of two possible worlds, the 
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closest one is that which bears the most similarity to our actual world, except for one thing: in 
that world the match had not been struck. So, we need to observe what happens in that world 
in which the match had not been struck. If in that world the match does not light, then C is true. 
The problem is, how do we know that this world is the closest, and not the world in which the 
match had not been struck, but the match nonetheless lighted? Kim explains this in the 
following paragraph:  
The obvious, and the only possible, answer seems to be that, in the actual world, 
dry matches struck in the presence of oxygen usually and reliably ignite, and 
that it is our knowledge of this regularity, or law, combined with knowledge of 
the actual circumstances in which the match was struck (e.g., it was dry, oxygen 
was present, etc.), that accounts for the judgment that the world in which the 
match that was not struck does not light is closer to the actual world than is the 
world in which the unstruck match lights. (2007: p. 234)  
 
5.2. Counterfactual account of mental causation 
 
Now, let us see how this analysis applies to mental causation. Kim considers a causal claim 
that “a sudden attack of migraine headache caused Susan a frightful sense of anxiety” (2007: 
p. 234). Following the counterfactual analysis similar to last paragraph, the proposition we are 
looking for would amount to:  
D – If Susan had not had the sudden migraine headache, she would not have experienced 
frightful anxiety. (Kim 2007: p. 234) 
This seems reasonably acceptable, as we tend to claim similar propositions on almost daily 
basis. Nonetheless, we need to observe the closest possible world to ours where everything 
remains the same but the fact that Susan had not had the sudden migraine headache. If in that 
world Susan had not had a headache, and did not experience frightful anxiety, that would make 
D true. However, similarly to the example of matches in the paragraph, we need to ask 
ourselves the same question; what is it in this occurrence that makes it in fact true? C was true 
on the basis of regularity, or law, in combination with actual circumstances. So, can the same 
be applied to D? LePore and Loewer (1987) argue that it can. They believe that one of the faults 
of Davidson’s anomalous monism (and mental causation in general) is that it required strict 
laws. Instead as LePore and Loewer claim, “a non-strict law may be improved upon by 
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explicitly including some of its ceteris paribus30 conditions in its antecedents.” (LePore and 
Loewer 1987: 632) Or, another option would be to opt for some kind of regularity. Kim 
elaborates this idea by claiming that the truth of D in that case must depend:  
on the regularity connecting sudden attacks of migraine headaches and feelings 
of anxiety. This regularity could be limited to Susan and others like her in 
relevant (presumably neurophysiological) respects, or it could be a (ceteris 
paribus) law for all people with migraine headaches. (2007: p. 234) 
 Is this enough to save mental causation without having to reduce mental to physical? I 
believe that LePore and Loewer, together with Loewer’s later work (2002; 2007) made a really 
strong case for saving mental causation in non-reductionist spirit. The notion of causal 
relevance, or dependency surely keeps the intuitive sense of importance of our mental 
properties in the causal chain leading to desirable effect. However, is such an approach 
sufficient, or we still need something more?  
 
5.3. Two problems of counterfactual (mental) causation 
 
I believe that the approach depicted above has a lot of merits. However, I do not think 
that counterfactual approach to mental causation can save it. There are two issues I find with 
this approach that I would like to elaborate on. The first one can be traced back to 
epiphenomenalism. Even a supporter of epiphenomenalism would agree with the statements 
“had not M occurred, P would not have occurred”, but this does not warrant a causal relation 
between M and P. The best way to describe this would be to use the example of matches. We 
have seen that the counterfactual claim “if the match hadn’t been struck, it would not have 
lighted” is true, but let us also add another effect from striking match. For example, if the match 
hadn’t been struck, smoke would not have appeared. So, an event c (striking a match) has two 
effects; e1 (smoke – an effect which can be epiphenomenal) and e2 (lighting of the match). 
According to counterfactual analysis, a proposition “if e1 had not occurred, e2 would not have 
occurred” is in fact true, but that does not mean that e1 caused e2. In this case, the counterfactual 
would be: if the smoke hadn’t appeared, the match would not have lighted. 
This is only one of many different objections and obstacles that counterfactual analysis 
of causation has come across in the past couple of decades. Naturally, counterfactualists have 
                                                          
30 Ceteris paribus means all things remaining unchanged. 
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been battling off these objections (together with the objections of preemption, 
overdetermination, context dependence), and to some extent quite successfully. But the 
question that I would like to pose still remains; should we base our idea of mental causation on 
a causal theory that is still very much under question?31 I do believe that appealing to 
counterfactuals is quite useful, especially when it comes to mental causation; it is a useful tool 
in understanding regularities, laws, and perhaps even in providing some sort of explanation. 
But when it comes to tracking causal processes, we require something more, something that 
generates or produces physical effects. This brings us to the second objection.  
Kim quotes Ned Hall (2004) in order to explain distinction between generative 
causation and causation as dependence (or relevance):  
Causation, understood as a relation between events, comes in at least two basic 
and fundamentally different varieties. One of these, which I call “dependence,” 
is simply that: counterfactual dependence between wholly distinct events. In 
this sense, event c is a cause of (distinct) event e just in case e depends on c. 
That is, just in case, had c not occurred, e would not have occurred. The second 
variety is rather more difficult to characterize, but we evoke it when we say of 
event c that it helps to generate or bring about or produce another event e, and 
for that reason I call it “production.” (Hall, 2004, p. 225) 
Based on this distinction, the counterargument to counterfactual analysis of (mental) causation 
would be the following: counterfactual approach to mental causation is not strong enough 
because it does not grasp generative or productive element of causation. In my opinion, the 
generative or productive element of causation is more important than the counterfactual one. 
The main reason why we would like to have generative notion of causation can be traced back 
to the second chapter, where I have argued that the main motivation for this whole discussion 
lies in saving the idea of human agency. Now, although Loewer and similar philosophers might 
argue that productive notion of causation is too strict32, it nonetheless seems to be a condition 
for human agency. The mere idea that my desires caused me to behave should perhaps be 
interpreted in the most straightforward sense; not only did my action counterfactually depend 
on my desires, but my desires generated, or brought about desired actions. I concur with Kim 
when he claims that “mere counterfactual dependence is not enough to sustain the causal 
                                                          
31 My bachelor’s thesis revolved around counterfactuals, where I have presented and put forward the arguments 
of preemption, overdetermination and context dependence, so for that reason I shall not be getting too much into 
details, as instead I will keep my focus on mental causation specifically. (Kobašlić 2016) 
32 Loewer might even argue that it does not deserve a place in contemporary physics (2002). 
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relation involved in our idea of acting upon the natural course of events and bringing about 
changes so as to actualize what we desire and intend.” (2007: p. 236)  
One objection that someone might point towards this argument would be to say that 
generative causation completely negates the possibility of mental causation in this 
straightforward sense. If it were truly possible, we would break the principle of physical 
closure. Have we once again reached the epiphenomenal conundrum? I do not think we have. 
In the final chapter of this thesis, I would like to present an option according to which we can 
have generative mental causation, but non-reductive physicalists are probably not going to like 
it. In brief, this is the argument: the only way we can save mental causation in terms of 
generating desired effects is to (i) find physical realizers of mental properties that enter causal 
relations, and (ii) reductively identify mental properties with their physical realizers.  
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6. FUNCTIONAL REDUCTIONISM 
 
6.1. Can reductionism save mental causation? 
 
At the beginning of the chapter 4 of his Mind in a Physical World (1998), Kim depicts 
a current attitude towards reductionism in general. Reductionism is often frowned upon, “it 
goes beyond mere criticism or expression of doctrinal disagreement; it is to put a person down, 
to heap scorn on him and his work.” (Kim 1998: p. 89) I don’t mean to provide an apology for 
reductionism in this chapter, but I do want to paint a picture according to which reductionism 
should not be viewed as a downfall of philosophical belief. As instead, some of the notions of 
reductionism should be clarified and we should cast some light upon certain principles of 
reductionism, as it could truly help us in gaining better understanding of the phenomenon that 
is in question – mental causation and mind-body interaction. The task is not easy. I would like 
to point out one argument from Kim (2005), in which he claims the following:  
(…) even if we are entitled to the conditional “Mental causation is possible only 
if some form of reductionism holds,” we cannot infer that reductionism is true. 
For we should not a priori rule out epiphenomenalism and other noncausal 
views of the mind. Reductionism must be earned—and mental causation, too, 
must be earned—by showing that mental properties are indeed reducible, in a 
relevant sense, to physical/biological properties. (p. 148)  
This attitude towards reductionism was already briefly depicted when we discussed the identity 
theory and eliminative materialism, as both of these options are reductionist. So, if 
reductionism is not an option, what do we have left? Our original dilemma posed the following 
options: either mental properties are epiphenomenal, or they have causal powers. If they have 
causal powers, they are either reductive or non-reductive. I do not think that they can have 
causal powers in non-reductive sense without facing the problem of causal exclusion. I believe 
that the only way to save mental causation would be to accept reductionism. Therefore, I would 
like to present one last model that just might save mental causation – Kim’s functional 
reductionism.  
6.2. Kim’s model   
 
This is going to be the last option that I am going to analyse, as it is also going to be 
one I personally endorse. Right from the start, functional reductionism might seem like an 
oxymoron; in the chapter 2.2. I presented functionalism as an opposing force to the identity 
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theory. Functionalists wanted to show that (i) mental states should be identified with functional 
roles that they perform and (ii) they can be multiply realizable. As we have seen, (ii) is a serious 
obstacle to the reduction of mental states to physical ones. In turn, functionalism, by being a 
position of non-reductive physicalism, had another problem and that is causal exclusion. So, 
the question is whether functional reductionism is a consistent option at all?  
There are two things that I would like to point out before we proceed to Kim’s model 
of reduction. The first one is that we have to distinguish two forms of functionalism; role 
functionalism and realizer functionalism. We have seen that Putnam belongs to the former 
group – the idea that mental states are to be identified with functional roles, whereas the latter 
form puts focus on typical physical realizers of mental states.33 Kim provides his own model 
of reduction on the basis of realizer functionalism. The second important thing to observe is 
that Kim’s model is a reaction to Nagel’s model according to which it would not be possible to 
reduce mental to physical.34 Kim argues against Nagel’s model by claiming that “a Nagelian 
reduction of psychology to neurophysiology is simply irrelevant to the issue of reductively 
explaining psychological phenomena and laws on the basis of neurophysiological laws.” (2005: 
p. 101) Therefore, Kim provides a three-step-plan on basis of which it would be possible to 
reduce mental to physical and thus save mental from being causally inefficacious. One of the 
main motivations as to why I am personally opting for Kim’s view is because it stands out in 
the sense of keeping both mental causation and scientific implications of reduction, without 
having to sacrifice the mental. What remains to be seen is whether it falls into the trap of 
multiple realizability.  
Kim’s three-step model of functional reduction is the following. First, we take a 
property that we want to reduce, and we functionalize it; i.e. we define it in terms of causal 
tasks and role that they usually perform. Let us take into consideration two examples; pain as 
a mental property, and genes. Pain might be defined as a property caused by some injury, that 
usually performs a causal task of groaning or wincing. When it comes to genes, Kim provides 
the following definition: “a gene may be defined as being a mechanism that encodes and 
transmits genetic information. (2005: p. 101) After we have functionally defined the property, 
                                                          
33 Proponents of this form are most notably Lewis and Armstrong. Heil (2013) provides definitions and 
distinctions of these forms, as well as Milojević (2017).  
34 Three criteria, or questions, are posited by Nagel’s model of reduction, the so-called “bridge-laws”, that pose 
problems to reducing mental to physical, and those are: the availability question, the explanatory question, and 
the ontological question, all three of which are analysed by Kim in (1998 and 2005). For the purposes of this 
thesis, I would not want to get into details of each of the criteria. Instead, I would like to focus on Kim’s argument 
as it is more relevant to mental causation and causal exclusion as such.  
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the next step would be to find the realizers of such property. To be more precise, in terms of 
higher- and lower-level properties, we are looking for a lower-level property that completes 
the causal work of the higher-level property. So, when it comes to pain, that would probably 
the C-fibres (although, as I’ve mentioned before, the exact picture is a bit more complex for 
that, but for the purpose of this argument this will suffice). For genes: “it turns out that DNA 
molecules are the mechanisms that perform the task of coding and transmitting genetic 
information—at least, in terrestrial organisms.” (p. 101) The third and final step would be to 
provide the exact explanation of the mechanism, i.e. how the realizers perform said causal 
tasks. For pain, we would require the explanation in terms or neurosynaptic activations, brain 
modules that interpret said neurons, and send back information to our hand which we move, or 
some other process that ends up in us groaning. “In the case of the gene and the DNA 
molecules, presumably molecular biology is in charge of providing the desired explanations”, 
argues Kim. (p. 101). Once we have successfully performed all three steps, we have also 
functionally reduced (and identified) higher-level properties to their lower-level realizers. 
More formally, the model has the following form: 
Step 1 [Functionalization of the target property] - Property M to be reduced is 
given a functional definition of the following form: 
  Having M = def. having some property or other P (in the reduction base domain) 
such that P performs causal task C.35 
   
Step 2 [Identification of the realizers of M] Find the properties (or mechanisms) 
in the reduction base that perform the causal task C. 
 
Step 3 [Developing an explanatory theory] Construct a theory that explains how 
the realizers of M perform task C. (Kim 2005, 101-102)  
There are two other elements to Kim’s theory that I would like to point out, which show 
the strengths of his theory. The first one is the principle of “local reduction”, as Kim calls it. 
Naturally, someone’s first reaction to his model might be to claim that the multiple realizability 
is a problem to Kim’s model just as it was to the identity theory. To fend of this objection, Kim 
introduced the notion of “local reduction”:  
Functional reduction, as I call it, can focus on the reduction of a mental property, 
or a group of them, for a specific population—that is, neural research on pain 
                                                          
35 “For a functionally defined property M, any property in the base domain that fits the causal specification 
definitive of M (that is, a property that performs causal task C) is called a “realizer” of M.” (Kim 2005: p. 101) 
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will aim at local reductions, not a one-shot global reduction (as suggested by 
the Nagel bridge-law model). (2005: p. 25) 
As opposed to the identity theory, we don’t see the property of being in pain as a global, 
universal property, but instead opt for a more local approach, for example human pain, or 
Martian pain, etc. Tt can get even more local, fine grained and specific. I believe this to be a 
move that is completely in line with scientific practice, shows a more realistic picture of 
reduction, and avoids what is in my opinion a rather too demanding conditions of Nagel’s “all-
or-nothing”, as Kim notes it (p. 102), condition for reduction.  
 The second element of Kim’s theory concerns with the causal efficacy of the mental. 
One might object to this theory (or any reductionist theory in general) that it reduces causal 
powers of mental properties, something that we have encountered beforehand. Kim battles off 
this objection by positing the causal inheritance principle:  
According to the causal inheritance principle, the causal powers of an instance 
of a second-order property are identical with (or a subset of) the causal powers 
of the first -order realizer that is instantiated on that occasion. (1998: p. 116) 
Sure, causal powers of mental properties might not be anything over-and-above the causal 
powers of their physical realizer, but this might not be such a bad consequence. Otherwise, we 
would have two options, either that of causal exclusion, or mere epiphenomenalism. This way, 
mental properties retain their causal powers, by inheriting them from their physical realizers.  
 There may, however, be some negative consequences to Kim’s position. Even if we 
accept this kind of local reduction, what happens with the more general property of being in 
pain. There must be something bringing together Martian pain, human pain, dolphin pain, etc. 
and that something is the property of being in pain, somehow making a full circle back to type-
type physicalism and the problem of multiple realizability. Kim has a way of avoiding this 
issue: instead of talking about pain as a general mental property, we should talk about it as a 
concept; merely a description or a designator of a property:  
(…) pains are pains because they conform to the definition of pain, not because 
they all share some hidden essence, like C-fiber stimulation or a pain quale. So 
there is the concept of pain, a concept given by its functional definition, but no 
property of pain, or being pain, that all pain instances have in common. (Kim 
2008: p. 231) 
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However, Moore and Campbell (2010) argue that by doing so, Kim in fact becomes an 
eliminativist, this risking a possibility of losing mental causation:  
Conceptualized functional reduction leads to the elimination of mental 
properties in exchange for mental concepts alone. This also represents the 
abandonment of mental causation, for on this view mental properties do not 
exist, and something that does not exist cannot be causally efficacious. (p. 44)  
I believe this is a somewhat wrong interpretation of Kim. First and foremost, just because Kim 
eliminates a more general, universal property of being a pain, that does not necessarily imply 
elimination of pain on all levels. Analogous to that, Kim argues that we might question the 
existence of property of being a table, but that by no means implies elimination of tables as 
such: “M as a concept stays, and individual instances falling under M are perfectly legitimate 
entities with causal-explanatory efficacy.” (2008: p. 231) Furthermore, we still have local 
reductions, which allow for causal-explanatory efficacy, as Kim would have it. I believe this is 
the correct way to interpret Kim; instead of seeking one-to-one relation of a higher-level 
property of being in pain with its realizer, we should observe such pain merely as a concept (in 
my opinion a really useful concept). We might have ontologically eliminated general property 
of being in pain, but local pains still exist, instantiated as human pain, Martian pain, perhaps 
even a robotic pain, and it has causal powers by simply being reducibly identified with some 
physical realizer. 
 
6.3. What can be reduced? The problem of qualia 
 
 So far, I have not discussed this question, but I would like to touch upon it just briefly, 
before concluding this thesis. Generally speaking, the question is the following: what mental 
properties can be reduced? In other words, are there mental properties that cannot be reduced? 
To answer this question, I will stick to Kim and his view. In his opinion, the only mental 
properties that cannot be reduced are qualia, the qualitative aspects of mental states. The main 
problem here is that we intuitively want to believe that the colours we see, for example at the 
traffic light, caused us to stop or go; that the qualia do play causal role. At the same time, we 
also tend to believe there is something irreducible about qualia. So, how is that consistent with 
Kim’s theory? Kim believes qualia are not reducible because they are simply not 
functionalizable. We can easily imagine a world with the inverted qualia36 where people see 
                                                          
36 Although the argument is originally suggested by Block, in this case I am using reiterations by Kim (2005).  
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red where we see green, and where they see green where we see red. Just briefly, his argument 
is the following:  
Such spectrum-inverted people would be as adept as we are in picking tomatoes 
out of mounds of lettuce and obeying traffic signals, and in general they would 
do just as well as we do with any other tasks requiring discrimination of red 
from green. If this is the case, colour qualia do not supervene on behaviour; two 
perceivers who behave identically with respect to input applied to their sensory 
receptors can have different sensory experiences. If that is true, qualia are not 
functionally definable; they are not task-oriented properties. (2005: p. 169-70) 
In short, Kim believes that qualia are epiphenomenal, they are the mental residue; irreducible 
but also causally impotent. The jury is still out on what qualia actually are, how they relate to 
the physical world, and whether there is any basis for them in our brains. If you ask Kim on 
whether (and what) mental properties are reducible, he replies with the following statements: 
Yes and no: intentional/cognitive properties are reducible, but qualitative 
properties of consciousness, or “qualia,” are not. In saving the causal efficacy 
of the former, we are saving cognition and agency. Moreover, we are not losing 
sensory experiences altogether: qualia similarities and differences can be saved. 
What we cannot save are their intrinsic qualities—the fact that yellow looks like 
this, that ammonia smells like that, and so on. (2005: p. 174) 
Whether this is something a non-reductive physicalist can accept is debatable. But that is Kim’s 
physicalism, or something near enough.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
One fundamental question has been in the crux of this thesis: how is it possible for our 
mental states and properties to exert their causal influence in the world that is fundamentally 
physical? It has not been an easy task, but I have tried to provide a broad array of different 
options, with all their advantages and disadvantages. After seeing the motivation in terms of 
the importance of causal efficacy of our mental states, and the origin of this issue stemming 
way back from Descartes, the task was to see if we can save mental properties from being 
epiphenomenal. I have hopefully shown that epiphenomenalism is not an option, but that still 
did not clear up the idea of mental causation, so we had to opt for another option. The first set 
of options was subsumed under the idea of reduction, which saves causal efficacy of mental 
properties, but reduces them to physical properties. The first such option was the identity 
theory. The idea of this position was to save mental causation by identifying mental types with 
physical, thus avoiding the problem of physical closure and overdetermination. However, this 
position soon met its demise when Putnam argued for functionalism and multiple realizability. 
On the other side of the reductive spectrum, the idea of eliminative materialism was briefly 
depicted. This approach was also rejected, but it did prove itself to be rather convenient, 
thought-provoking and interesting. The second set of options was the non-reductive approach, 
depicted in terms of its doctrines and compared to Davidson’s anomalous monism, which 
largely influenced the whole debate. However, Kim’s argument of causal exclusion showed 
that non-reductive ambition to have their cake and eat it fell short. In turn, some non-reductive 
physicalists wanted to save mental causation without falling into the trap of causal exclusion 
by appealing to counterfactuals. At the end of that chapter, I argued that mental properties are 
counterfactually relevant. Nevertheless, for mental properties to be causally efficacious, they 
need to meet higher standards of causation, i.e. the generative or productive sense, something 
that counterfactual analysis cannot provide. Finally, Kim’s own approach to solving the 
problem of causal exclusion was provided, the one I personally endorsed. His idea is one of 
functional reductionism, according to which mental properties are functionally defined and 
then (locally) reduced and identified with their physical realizers. Whether Kim is completely 
successful in saving mental efficacy without facing the problem of multiple realizability, 
without eliminating mental properties more generally is still open for debate. I believe this 
might be the best option we have so far.  
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Of course, there is still a lot to deal with. I also believe that there are many ways in 
which the debate on mental causation can turn up. One way in which this debate on mental 
causation can take its course would be in the context of the new forms of artificial intelligence. 
The progress in developing new artificial intelligence is a two-way street; the more we know 
about the functioning of artificial intelligence, the more we know about human behaviour and 
vice versa. Another route the debate on mental causation can develop would be hand in hand 
with neurosciences, as they still have a long way ahead of them. The scope of our knowledge 
about our brain and its functioning is still immensely low. However, as I said on different 
occasions, this should not stop us or impede us in making progress. As instead, it should be a 
motivation. I believe, if all cards are played right, philosophy could have a great role in the 
ages to come in terms of better understanding and explaining our nature.  
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